

VZCZCXYZ0025
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6678 1772133
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 262110Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 066678

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2034
TAGS: PARM PREL MASS ETTC TU IR SY
SUBJECT: SHIPMENT OF MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS-RELATED EQUIPMENT

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).

¶1. (S) This is an immediate action request to Embassy Ankara. Please see paragraph 3.

BACKGROUND

¶2. (S/NF) We have information that there was a shipment this month of military communications-related Mercedes Benz vehicles from Iran via Turkey that were destined for Syria. The shipment will possibly be followed by a shipment of electronic suites associated with these trucks. We want to approach the Turkish Government and request them to be alert for this potential ground shipment and to interdict it at its border crossings. A similar shipment of probably electronic warfare (EW) vehicles following the same route occurred in December 2008. This shipment likely entered Turkey through the Gurbulak Border Crossing and likely passed into Syria at the Killis Border Crossing.

ACTION REQUEST

¶3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be left as a non-paper, post is requested to approach appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in violation of UNSCR 1747 that the Government of Turkey (GOT) use all available means to prevent the transshipment of these electronic suites and detain it.

OBJECTIVES

¶4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:

-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding Iran's shipment of the military communications-related Mercedes Benz vehicles in early June and its likely attempt to ship electronic suites associated with these trucks to Syria;

-- Inform the Government of Turkey (GOT) that in December 2008 there was a similar shipment of probably electronic warfare (EW) vehicles from Iran through Turkey to Syria and that the electronic suites will likely be shipped along the same route;

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from transferring any arms or related materiel;

-- Urge the GOT to take action against this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747, and in accordance with the GOT's laws and

authorities;

-- Advise the GOT that the EW vehicles that were shipped and the electronic suites waiting to be shipped are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement regime;

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to be vigilant in investigating suspect shipments from Iran, to interdict them and take positive action with regard to other earlier requests on other shipments. As a NATO ally, we try to provide Turkey with as much information as possible on these issues, which could help lead them to take action in detaining shipments; and

-- Emphasize that, should we receive additional information regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously as possible.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER

15. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking points/non-paper:

-- We have information that in early June, Iran transported eighteen (18) military communications-related Mercedes Benz vehicles to Syria via Turkey.

-- A similar shipment of probably electronic warfare (EW) vehicles occurred in December 2008 when vehicles departed from Iran and subsequently arrived at a military facility in Syria. Information indicates that these vehicles were shipped on tractor-trailers from Iran to Syria through Turkey.

-- We are sharing this information with you, and are requesting your help and to prevent such transfers of proliferation concern, and to ensure that Iran does not transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 1737, 1747, and 1803 through your territory.

-- This shipment likely entered Turkey through the Gurbulak Border Crossing and likely passed into Syria at the Killis Border Crossing.

-- We have additional information that the electronic suites associated with these trucks remain in Iran, but are likely to be shipped following the same route. These suites are approximately 4 meters long, 2 meters wide and have an entry door on one end.

-- We believe these items constitute arms or related materiel and are covered by UNSCR 1747.

-- UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.

-- In the spirit of this resolution, we request you be alert for possible shipments of the electronic suites across your borders and stop them from being transferred to Syria.

-- We also believe the EW vehicles that were shipped to Syria in December 2008 are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), Munitions List (ML) 11.

-- In addition, we believe the electronic suites waiting to be shipped that are associated with the 18 military communications-related Mercedes Benz vehicles which were shipped this month are also controlled under WA, ML 11.

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued cooperation, support, and willingness to enact prompt and thorough efforts to promote interdictions designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive material by Iran.

END POINTS

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

¶6. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its efforts as soon as possible.

POINTS OF CONTACT

¶7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are Michael Rolleri, ISN/CATR, and Matt Hardiman, EUR/PRA.
CLINTON